Refugee policies and discourses in Eastern Europe in the context of migration processes and structural inequalities within Europe'

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Question

• Why have we experienced a massive political opposition toward any joint management of the refugee system in Eastern Europe?
• Why is there a massive and hegemonic anti-refugee public opinion in some countries in Eastern Europe?
• How can we understand the above developments in its migratory context from a historical structural point of view?
• What makes this radicalization a historical event? What temporalities link this event to processes and structures (Grandits-Brunnbauer)?
• What historical political blocks have emerged when discourses and structures are congruent and thus hegemony is secured (Gramsci)?
Temporalities and interconnections: from structures to politics

- Historical biopolitical discourses and meanings, public opinion
- Local demographic emptying of EE and unequal exchange
- Demographic and migratory processes globally and in non Eastern Europe
- Elite strategies
- EE elite strategies
- Radicalization and panic
Demographic nationalism

• **Definition:** Combination of selective and hierarchical anti-immigration discourses and regulations. Selective state-sponsored pronatalism and the promotion of „own resources” for avoiding „the death of nation“.

• The aim is the „survival”, the „rise” of the nation in the context of unequal development, most importantly the satisfaction of the human resource needs for becoming competitive.

• This is with long tradition: goes back to Herder in the 18th century.
Allow few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, ESS 2002
Allow few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, ESS 2006
Allow few or no immigrants from poorer countries outside Europe, ESS 2014
Net migration rate, WPP 2015 revision

- Hungary
- Portugal
- Czech
- Slovakia
- Poland
- Bulgaria
- Romania
Whether refugees can be let in. Survey 1992-2016

Romania, Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Romania (Transylvania), 2016

In your opinion the number of immigrants ....? 2016,

Institute of Minorities, Cluj and Századvég, Budapest

- **DO NOT KNOW AND NO ANSWER**
  - Romania: 8.2%
  - Transylvania: 7.9%
  - Hungary: 7.5%

- **SHOULD BE INCREASED SUBSTANTIALLY**
  - Romania: 0%
  - Transylvania: 0%
  - Hungary: 0%

- **SHOULD BE INCREASED SOMEWHAT**
  - Romania: 4.3%
  - Transylvania: 16.6%
  - Hungary: 24.2%

- **SHOULD REMAIN THE SAME**
  - Romania: 16.6%
  - Transylvania: 24.2%
  - Hungary: 36.6%

- **SHOULD BE REDUCED SOMEWHAT**
  - Romania: 13.1%
  - Transylvania: 12.1%
  - Hungary: 30.8%

- **SHOULD BE REDUCED SUBSTANTIALLY**
  - Romania: 50.3%
  - Transylvania: 50.3%
  - Hungary: 60.6%
Rejection patterns

• Historical patterns

• Some countries on the European semi-periphery. Those which received larger number of immigrants during the first phase of the globalization cycle and not the emigrant ones

• There are differences within even in terms of ethnicity and the same country.

• Inner segmentation: threat (struggling groups), welfare and cultural competitive (skilled workers, employees,) Defense of the European space for themselves?

• Intra European interplay: locked into dependencies
East and West migratory relationship: Historical stability but increasing Eurocentrism in outmigration from Eastern Europe since 1960

SEE countries and their main destination countries (Country of birth, stock, UN matrices)

Source: UN, 2013
Illustration: Ági Tátrai-Pap.
Major migratory sources: only within the region: Emptying region

Source: un, 2013
Illustration: Ági Tatórai-Pap.
Per capita GDP 1950–2010. Increase of inequality

Not common structural positions

Capital transfers, Remittances, Migrants

divergence

www.seemig.eu
No decrease of inequality and opening institutional space
Key migratory targets for SEE

GDP per capita as % of world average 1950-2010
Maddison databank, Geary-Khamis USD
Demographic emptying of SEE

SEEMIG: Melegh Fassmann, Musil, Bauer, Gruber
Demographic emptying in Hungary low fertility, increasing outmigration and ageing.

Who will pay for the remaining elderly population in the current system?

Seemig projection,
Földházi Erzsébet,
Dickmann Ádám,
Melegh Attila

Figure 37. Population size in medium, „real migration” and changing migration model scenarios of population projection, 2012-2060
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<th>2015</th>
<th>2020</th>
<th>2025</th>
<th>2030</th>
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1) [www.opendatastatistics.org/eurostat/proj_10a2150a](http://www.opendatastatistics.org/eurostat/proj_10a2150a)
2) [World Population Prospects, the 2010 Revision](http://unpopulation.un.org/wpp/)
Conflicting structural positions

• Unequal exchange: stable hierarchies
• Eastern Europe as labor reservoir versus „West” utilizing that labor: labor force is to be improved by labor immigration:
• No immigration experience from outside in EE
• Demographic decline to be handled differently in EE
• Coalition against: „Globalization block” (European decline is to be counterbalanced by migration, territory is less important
• Versus East European nationalist block: „Own resources” only
East-West communication: Migration panic becoming mainstream throughout Europe
Standard Eurobarometer, July 2016

Hungary: The defense of Europe and the worry of social security at home

**Own problem:** health and social security

**Problem of Europe:** migration and terrorism
Defenders of Europe?

• In the spring of 2016 Denmark plus four East European states are among the top countries worrying on immigration concerning Europe (above 60% Estonia Hungary, Czech Republic, Latvia)

• Romania, Croatia and Greece are among the least worried „for Europe”.

• In the ratio of the ones claiming terrorism is the biggest threat, then from Tallin to Sofia. „The misery of East European small states” (plus Ireland, Malta) are in the forefront (István Bibó in two ways: East European states and hysteria). France, UK, Belgium (much lower percentage)

• Dramatic discrepancy if the question is specified for the own country: Immigration, terrorism is not a problem here only for Europe. (outmigration is not asked) With the exception of Estonia, health, unemployment, prices.

Eastern Europe: The Last Barrier between Christianity and Islam

by Giulio Meotti
September 20, 2016 at 5:00 am
https://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/8972/eastern-europe-christianity-islam
The common denominator with the West: Eurocentrism:

• Orientalist panic and loosing positions radically.
• Why are they not passive and poor? Crisis of control and the loss of global positions:
• The war in the East is normal
• The incoming people are not poor. “Hey, those people fleeing war in Syria aren’t poor at all! Look, they all have smartphones!”
• Loss of control and too much „action” on their side. They are for just better life
„Demographic crisis”: Nation and Europe to be protected

• Hungarian prime minister: Europe is getting weaker... now it is struggling to maintain even to keep a status of being a regional power...Hundreds of thousands live with us about whom we do not know what they are looking for...That nation or community, which is not able to reproduce itself, it surrenders the right to exist. This problem cannot be solved...with tricks, migrants and settlement...from outside ... as then that nation partially or totally gives up its national identity. Our house is also burning, but of Europe also. (Budapest, January 23, 2017, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/hirek/miota-nincs-ellenzekben-az-mnb-latvanyos-a-gazdasagi-fejlodes)

• Race suicide talk. Slovakia no compact Muslim community, Romania, Poland: Christian Europe,

• Dying nations?

• Barbed wires. Giving up refugee protection.
Symbolic fight against intra-European inequalities: challenging inner hegemony and competition among workers of Europe.

- East European are to be used as migrant labor in Europe: this is a Euro-nationalist answer. This is why we need to defend Europe.

- David Cameron was told by his Hungarian counterpart, Viktor Orban, not to treat Hungarians in the UK as migrants. Orban said this was very important to people in his country. “For us it is very important that we are not considered as migrants. Words matter here ... We would like to make it quite clear that we are not migrants into the UK. But we are the citizens of a state that belongs to the European Union who can take jobs anywhere freely within the European Union ... We do not want to go to the UK and take something from them. We do not want to be parasites. We want to work there, and I think that Hungarians are working well. They should get respect and they should not suffer discrimination.” ... Cameron said he was still pushing his plan to stop EU migrants claiming work benefits in the UK for four years. But he stressed that he was open to alternative proposals that might reduce the immigration “pull factor”.

[Image of Cameron and Orban]
Non-territorial national expansion in the era of demographic emptying. Nationalist, authoritarian globalization in Eastern Europe

• After the invention of global supply chains, now the invention of non-territorial labor force chains. Flexible use.

• Hungary benefits a lot from migration from Vietnam and China: Why not to use it? Previously blocked discursively.

• The change of citizenship laws in order to increase hierarchy between „Hungarians” and non-ethnic, historically not linked immigrants.

• Non-territorial citizenship given in the name of virtual national expansion and reintegration for the sake of securing labor force and extra population when there is demographic decline

• Various diaspora laws, Romania, Hungary

• Outside Europe also (South Korea etc.)

https://www.gyulaihirlap.hu/111407-hatvanoten-vallhatjak-magukat-magyar-allampolgarna
Thank you for your attention!