The European ‘refugee crisis’ and its aftermath
Challenges for Europe and the world

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International conference
“Shifting Contexts and Patterns of Migration - Comparing Europe and Central-North-America”
El Colegio de México
Mexico-City 24/25 of March 2017

1. Turbulent autumn of 2015 ...
2. ... and problem externalization in 2016
3. Challenges for Europe and the World
4. The triangle of political regimes, refugees and civil society
1. Turbulent autumn of 2015...

In 2015 about 1 Mio. refugees entered Germany, about 1.5 Mio. the EU without residence authorisation. Just the first weekend of Sept. some 20,000 refugees entered Germany – and were welcomed by the majority of society.

31.08.2015: In her summer interview chancellor Angela Merkel said concerning the refugee crisis: „Germany is a strong country. We should follow the motive: We already managed many things – we will make it."

02.09.2015: 3-year old Aylan Kurdi, his mother and brother died in Bodrum/Turkey while there asylum petition was rejected by Canada.

Syrian refugees in Budapest with Merkel-photo /Sept. 2015

A volunteer (Andreas Duchmann) distributing liquids to refugees.
Development of no. of refugees in Germany beginning of 2014 to mid 2016
Registered refugees per week in thousand

1. Turbulent autumn of 2015...

Source: IAB 2016: Aktuelle Berichte Eine vorläufige Bilanz der Fluchtmigration nach Deutschland. No. 16/2016, p. 3
1. Turbulent autumn of 2015...

Asylum applicants EU28 and selected countries 2008-2016

Source: Eurostat 22-02-2017: Asylum and first time asylum applicants (rounded) [migr_asyappctza]
Note: for 2016 not including data for Austria (88.160 in 2015), France (76.165 in 2015), Greece (13.205 in 2015), UK (40.160 in 2015) and some other countries with some hundreds to max. 2.700 in 2015 – en total unos 217.690
1. Turbulent autumn of 2015...

Asylum applications according to country, 2015 and 2016

Note: the y-axis is interrupted with a different interval above the interruption from that below it.

(1) 2016: not available.
Source: Eurostat (online data code: migr_asyappaza)
Principal components of CEAS (approved by EP + EC 26.6.2013):
• Regulation (UE) 603/2013: homogenization of EURODAC
• Regulation (UE) 604/2013: Dublin III
• Directive 2013/33/UE: minimum standards of accommodation
• Directive 2013/32/UE: common procedures asylum petitions
• Directive 2011/95/UE: common qualification norms

Number and type of decisions issued in first instance in EU+ countries

In 2016, EU+ countries issued 1 130 110 decisions at first instance, 87% more than in 2015. This is the highest number of first instance decisions registered in EU+ since 2008. In the EU+ as a whole, the share of positive decisions was 57% of total decisions in first instance, 15 percentage points higher than in 2015, reflecting a higher number of decisions issued on cases with high recognition rates, mostly Syrian (98% positive decisions) and Eritrean nationals (92% positive decisions).
1. Turbulent autumn of 2015...

Variation of recognition rates according to country of citizenship of asylum applicants in the EU 28 in 2013

![Diagram showing variation in recognition rates for different countries in the EU 28 in 2013]

**Figure 17: Disparity in recognition rates in the EU28, 10 main citizenships, 2013 (> 100 decisions by MS)**

Review of the so-called European refugee crisis and its aftermath
(“this is not a crisis of numbers; it is a crisis of solidarity” (former UN Secretary General Ban Ki Moon)

1. The tender plantlet of CEAS was too weak to cope with the enormous challenges
   • In 2015 refugees concentrated in few countries (Austria, Germany, Sweden)
   • In 2016 asylum applications concentrated in Germany and rose in Italy and Greece
   • Recognition rates and asylum practice varies substantially between EU-28 states
   • The Dublin rules did not work in 2015 – and were out of order long before

2. In spite of burden sharing a policy of 'organised non-responsibility’/NIMBY prevailed
   • 2000s: Canarian Islands and Strait of Gibraltar since 2000s – blaming Spain,
   • 2013: Lampedusa, Mare Nostrum, not registering – blaming Italy
   • 2015: Opening borders for refugees by Germany – blaming Merkel

3. Due to ‘organized non-responsibility’ there was no common EU refugee strategy
   • Individual asylum as dominant instrument: DE 174.000; EU-28: 571.000 in 2014
   • Resettlement programs marginal: EU-MS voluntarily since 2011; 7.670 in 2014
   • Mass influx of displaced persons: EU decision pending; DE 30.000 in 2013/2014
   • Definition of safe third countries of origin: each MS defines individually
Refugee crisis not resolved but externalized
- Fragile and debatable treaty with Turkey
- Hotspots in Italy and Greece
- Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia as save countries?
- Border control to third countries like Libya?
Deepening of EU integration: for refugee protection or for protection against refugees?

1. Externalisation of border control has a long history
   ○ Spain negotiated ‘add packages’ with Senegal, Mauretania and Morocco since 2008 – after 31,600 refugees having arrived at Canaries in 2006

Table 1. Part of the Western Mediterranean Route within the main migratory routes into the EU

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total detected irregular border crossings (all routes)</th>
<th>Detected irregular border crossings on Western Mediterranean Route (WMR)</th>
<th>Share of WMR irregular border crossings in total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>151,135</td>
<td>6,500</td>
<td>4.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>104,120</td>
<td>5,000</td>
<td>4.8 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>73,160</td>
<td>6,400</td>
<td>7.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>101,800</td>
<td>6,800</td>
<td>6.68 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>283,175</td>
<td>7,840</td>
<td>2.75 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015 (Jan./Nov.)</td>
<td>885,410</td>
<td>12,516</td>
<td>1.41 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Sergio Carrera, Jean-Pierre Cassarino, Nora El Qadim, Mehdi Lahlou and Leonhard den Hertog: EU-Morocco Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection: A model to follow? CEPS papers No. 87 / January 2016, p. 8
Deepening of EU integration: for refugee protection or for protection against refugees?

1. Externalisation of border control has a long history – and is ambiguous
   - Spain negotiated ‘add packages’ with Senegal, Mauretania and Morocco since 2008 – after 31,600 refugees having arrived at Canaries in 2006
   - Italy signed a contract with Gaddafi/Libya in 2003, the EU with Gaddafi in 2010 – EU Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malmström, called it “a landmark in the fight against illegal immigration”
   - Declaring countries as “save third countries” and signing treaties of “Cooperation on Readmission, Borders and Protection” e.g. Morocco-EU as ambiguous
     - EU borders have to be “refugee friendly” (Carrera et al. 2016: 15), grant legal access to asylum
     - Can EU cooperate with third countries in mass arrests, detention, ‘hot returns’ or pushbacks?
     - Should EU condition development aid/visa facilitation to ‘effective’ cooperation on readmission?

2. Treaty EU-Turkey in March 2016 – more than ambiguous!? 
   - Repatriation to Turkey of those Syrians not asking for asylum in Greece or being rejected
   - Resettlement of Syrian refugees in Turkey into the EU (same amount as repatriated)
   - Up to 3 + 3 billion € for Turkey’s refugee system until 2018; visa-free EU-travel of Turks?
     - Has Turkey a working asylum system? 38,595 accepted cases, 200,000 pending in 2/2017
     - Infrastructure and asylum procedures in Greece? support from EASO and Frontex
     - Only 3,565 Syrians resettled into EU until Feb. 2017 – is Turkey ‘safe third country’ for e.g. Kurds?
     - Is EU dependent of an authoritarian regime (refoulement and shot deads of Syrians at border)?
Deepening of EU integration: for refugee protection or for protection against refugees?

3. Hotspots in Greece and Italy - ambiguous
   - Hotspots as “area in which the host Member State, the Commission, relevant union agencies and participating Member State cooperate with the aim of managing an existing or potential disproportionate migratory challenge characterized by a significant increase in the number of migrants arriving at the external border” (EBCG regulation 13.09.2016)
   - EASO, Frontex and Europol will support frontline Member States to swiftly identify, register and fingerprint incoming migrants
   - 5 hotspots in Greece (Lesvos, Samos, Chios, Leros and Kos) capacity of 7,450 places; six hotspots in Italy (Lampedusa, Trapani, Pozzallo, Taranto and Augusta) of 1,600 places
     - Stay only for some days; no closed centers; legal access to asylum process
     - independent monitoring; equal treatment of nationalities (ECRE et al. 2017)

4. ‘Outsourcing of border control to transit countries like Libya?’
   - Reception centers in third countries, especially of North Africa, where asylum procedure would be organized
   - Especially vulnerable groups (persecuted women, minors, elder people) could be channeled in resettlement programs
     - Who would be legally responsible and who manages such centers?
     - Would such centers attract additional mixed migration flows?

5. Fighting the causes of forced migration and refuge – what has to be done?
All EU member states threatened, many overstrained by refugee crisis 2015:
- Lack of physical space/centres of reception; lack of economic resources for care
- Lack of specialists for review process, no tradition/experience of immigration
- Prejudices/xenophobia in social groups, strong right-wing parties, high unemployment and competing social groups

History and structural differences inside EU-28 do matter

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Imperial/colonial tradition</th>
<th>Former empire</th>
<th>Former colony</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nation/state building</td>
<td>Centuries ago</td>
<td>Decades ago</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of nation/state</td>
<td>Republican-central</td>
<td>Federal-decentral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socio-cultural perception</td>
<td>Homogeneous</td>
<td>Heterogeneous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role of migration</td>
<td>Country of emigration</td>
<td>Country of immigration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Concept of integration</td>
<td>Unilateral assimilation</td>
<td>multiple Integration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Timing EU-affiliation</td>
<td>Pioneer/founding member</td>
<td>Very recent latecomer</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
1. A vicious circle of lack of (economic, social, cultural, political) development, organized violence and forced migration is at the center of the causes of refuge – in Middle East, Africa and in Central America. Social-societal, not natural problems!

2. If solutions don’t come to the spots of humanitarian crisis, people will come to where they hope to get solutions.

3. The European Union and the USA tend to externalize the refugee challenge by ascribing the role of controlling and buffering the impact of these vicious circles to countries of transit like Turkey and Mexico.
In 2015 some 244 mio. international migrants, 41% plus compared to 2000

“The number of forcibly displaced people has grown and the reality of global displacement is increasingly complex. The number of people displaced by violence and conflict today is the highest since World War II.” (IOM 2014: Global Migration Trends: an overview, p. 1)

3. Challenges for Europe and the World

http://fsi.fundforpeace.org/map/2015heatmap.png

http://popstats.unhcr.org/en/overview
While much of the world has made rapid progress in reducing poverty in the past 60 years, areas characterized by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence are being left far behind, their economic growth compromised and their human indicators stagnant" (WB 2011: 1)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Decade</th>
<th>Violence onsets in countries with no previous conflict (%)</th>
<th>Violence onsets in countries with a previous conflict (%)</th>
<th>Number of onsets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960s</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980s</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990s</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2000s</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: Walter 2010; WDR team calculations.
Note: Previous conflict includes any major conflict since 1945.

"Many countries and subnational areas now face cycles of repeated violence, weak governance, and instability. First, conflicts often are not one-off events, but are ongoing and repeated: 90 percent of the last decade’s civil wars occurred in countries that had already had a civil war in the last 30 years.” (WB 2011: 2)

"Likewise, recent research suggests that the impact of natural disasters is more pronounced in fragile states. Not only are fragile countries more vulnerable to the effects of disasters, but disasters and external shocks can interrupt institutional transformation, as was the case in promising sectors after Haiti’s devastating earthquake in early 2010." (WB 2011: 103)
3. Challenges for Europe and the World

Intervening factors

- External intervention
- Land grabbing
- Climate change
- Privatisation of organised violence
- Organised violence
- Non-nationalistic policies
- Transnationalisation of economy, labour, markets, communication
- Demilitarising of migration politics
- Demilitarising answers to organised violence
- Dogmatic (religious, ethnic, cultural) identity politics
- Reducing inequalities

Lack of Development

Forced migration

Organised violence
For analysing forced migration in the (vicious) cycle with (lack of) development and organised violence three main actor groups have to be considered: (1) political regimes, (2) refugees and their networks, (3) civil societies’ collective and corporative actors – these collective and corporative actors are geared by their (interest/value-related) goals and by the supposed mutual expectations of legitimacy (neo-institutionalism).
4. The triangle of political regimes, refugees and civil society

Research project RUB 2013 – 2016 analysing situation of arrival, refuge and asylum, especially in light of CEAS norms, in Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Malta, Spain reconstructing refugee related organisational networks of NGOs, GOs and other (scientific etc.) organisations; Website www.rub.de/marem

**Refugee and asylum related organizational networks**

- have a long history, are growing and differentiating,
- work as interface between civil society, refugees, political regime and mass media,
- structure and increase mutual expectations of legitimacy,
- are the main opponent and controller of racist and xenophobic groups
- function as “coral reef” of social movements for refugee protection
Conclusions concerning the European ‘refugee crisis’ of 2015

1. The Common European Asylum System (CEAS) of the EU represents advanced formal regulations of refugee protection – a nice talk.

2. In practice, CEAS was fragile before, but collapsed in 2015; ‘organized non-responsibility’ prevailed, the normative and cognitive basis of CEAS proved to be too weak – bad action.

3. In Germany and other countries, civil society and multi-level networks of refugee related organizations to some extent filled the gap the states left between ‘talk’ and ‘action’.

4. Until now, the tendency of strengthening and externalizing border protection prevails as compared to strengthening the European refugee protection.

Prospects and global challenges

1. ‘refugee crisis 2015’ and next crisis foreseeable; no alternative to deepen EU-integration, fight the causes of refuge and new global narrative of migration.

2. Legal entry routes, joint Mediterranean rescue, joint EU-border control, common and CEAS-based responsibility are needed, as well as joint programs for (durable) resettlement and (temporal) mass influx of DPs.

3. Responsibility and burden of costs of border control, asylum procedures, distribution of accepted asylum applicants have to be shared at EU level.

Thanks for your attention – and questions!